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Abstract⎯The gas central processing plant as a facility used to process natural gas had a variety of components that were 
so complex and many in number. To reduce the risk of failure of these components it was necessary to carry out 
maintenance. But it would be very inefficient if all the components were treated at the same level, considering that there 
were so many and the human resources that were owned were very limited. Therefore, in taking care of these components it 
was necessary to prioritize them according to their critical level. In this research, in determining the critical level of a 
component using risk-based methods according to the available standards, namely NORSOK Z-008. By making a hierarchy 
and asset level register of all components, then the value of the probability rating and consequence rating was determined. 
So that the criticality ranking of each component was obtained according to the criticality risk matrix that was converted 
from the company's risk matrix, so that the critical level of the component was obtained in the levels of H (high), M 
(medium), and L (low). With the critical level of this component, the company did not need to take care of all the 
components. In this research, there was 33 equipment with 140 subunits/subsystems, and the total number of components 
was 674. Of the 674 components as many as 28 components had a critical level of H (high), 192 components had a critical 
level M (medium), and 454 components had L critical level (low) of each critical level that has been obtained, it is not 
necessary to carry out maintenance with the same level to all components. In this research, every component that has H 
(high) criticality level will be treated as a Preventive Maintenance, while a component with a critical level of M (medium) 
will be Preventive Maintenance if needed, and a component with L critical level (low) will be treated Corrective 
Maintenance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION1 
Gas processing consists of the separation of 
various types of hydrocarbons and fluids from pure 
natural gas. Before natural gas can be transported or 
delivered to consumers, the gas must be purified first. 
Natural gas must be separated from various 
contaminants and fluids such as crude oil (if any), and 
generally, there are other hydrocarbon mixtures such as 
ethane, propane, butane, and pentane. In addition, raw 
natural gas contains water vapor, hydrogen sulfide 
(H2S), carbon dioxide, helium, nitrogen, and other 
compounds. In the gas processing process, there are 
several processes including Manifold, separation, Gas 
Treatment, Compression, Gas Storage, Metering & 
Export System, Utility System. [1] 
Gas central processing plant as a facility used to 
process natural gas to become a gas that is ready to use 
has a variety of components that are so complex and 
many in number. In caring for these components is very 
inefficient if all components get attention and 
maintenance at the same level. Companies that have 
central processing plant gas facilities must have a sound 
strategy to be able to compete with other companies. 
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One of them was in the strategy of caring for these 
components by using the Equipment Critical Analysis 
(ECA) method. Besides being used to analyze critical 
components, ECA is also used as a Screening tool in 
analyzing RBI according to DNV-RP-G101 standards 
[2].  
Previous researchers who have examined the 
criticality of components were Rakesh Kumar Singh et 
al [3] showed the critical value of the components from 
the highest to the lowest with the AHP method. The 
results of the research found the highest critical level in 
the boiler component, and the lowest critical value was 
in the boiler feed pump. Other researchers were 
Fereshteh Jaderi et al [4] The research applied the AHP 
and Delphi Techniques method to analyze the critical 
sources at the plant. The conclusion of the research 
explains that critical analysis can help prioritize assets, 
improve maintenance management, reduce maintenance 
costs and increase production. Besides AHP method, 
FMECA method also familiar to be used in criticality 
analysis. FMECA is procedure to determine failure 
mode and classify potential failure effect according the 
severity, likelihood and detection [5-7] [14]. 
In application for petrochemical plants, a 
combination of criticality analysis used combination 
method HAZOP and FMECA had done by El-Arkam 
et.al [8]. FMECA also used to analyze criticality in 
liquefied natural gas fuel gas supply, however the 
methodology integrated the independency of axiomatic 
design and the hierarchical of FMECA [9]. Another 
method, using critical path software for project 
management can be used to determine risk register for 
critical activities [10]. In this research, the Norsok Z-008 
is implemented to determine criticality for gas central 
processing. 
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II. METHOD 
A. Determine of Hierarchy, Main Function, Sub 
Function, and Redundancy 
The purpose of determining the hierarchy of this 
system is to determine the scope of the system to be 
carried out by Equipment Critical Analysis (ECA), in 
this stage, the system will be divided into the main 
function, subfunction until it reaches the lowest level, in 
this research namely component. 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
EXAMPLE OF HIERARCHY TABLE OF GAS CENTRAL PROCESSING PLANT BASED ON ISO 14224 
Industry 
Business 
Category 
Installation 
Category 
Plant/Unit Section/System 
Natural 
Gas 
Midstream 
Oil and gas 
production 
Onshore 
production 
plant 
Separation System 
Natural 
Gas 
Midstream 
Oil and gas 
production 
Onshore 
production 
plant 
Dehidration 
System 
 
 
TABLE 2 
EXAMPLE OF SYSTEM/SECTION CLASSIFICATION BASED ON ISO 14224 
ID Asset System/Section Classification 
01 Separation System 
02 Dehydration System 
03 Compression System 
04 Gas Export System 
 
 
B. Asset Register 
Data collection on each component in the object of 
analysis in accordance with its scope at the stage of 
determining the hierarchy for the future will be 
analyzed to determine the critical value. 
 
C. Determine the Probability Rating 
The failure rate (probability rating) of a component 
was identified and determined by knowing how an asset 
has failed. This failure rate was obtained based on the 
company's historical data and on the 2002 OREDA 
Handbook data bank [11]. Then it was categorized 
according to the Company Risk Matrix. 
 
D. Determine the Consequence Rating 
Each component had been classified according to 
hierarchy and the failure rate was determined, then an 
analysis of the risk was caused by the loss of the 
function of an asset based on a credible failure scenario. 
 
E. Determine the Equipment Criticality Analysis 
After determining the point of the probability of 
failure and consequences. in this research, in 
determining the criticality of components using risk-
based methods according to the available standards, 
namely NORSOK Z-008 [12]. By prioritizing 
components based on their critical level into levels H 
(high), M (medium), and L (low). 
 
 
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
A. Collecting Data 
The data needed in conducting this research were all 
components in the gas central processing plant. This 
data is obtained by recording all the components in the P 
& ID image that are available. From these data the 
levels of Hierarchy, Main function, Subfunction, and 
Redundancy are determined.  
 
B. Hierarchy, Main function, Subfunction and 
Redundancy 
Hierarchy Determination by using ISO 14224 for the 
industry level to the section level was illustrated by the 
hierarchy of pyramid-shaped taxonomy with level 1 to 
level 9 [13]. Table 1 Showed examples of classification 
for hierarchy from Industry level (level 1) to 
Section/system level (level 5). Classifying according to 
this hierarchy can easily identify which component was 
in what scope or system. Table 2 showed an example of 
a section/system along with its Asset ID. 
Determination of this hierarchy is done with the aim 
of knowing the level or level of a component in the 
hierarchy. Determination of Hierarchy is carried out 
using ISO 14224 and Norsok-Z-008 standards. 
According to ISO 14224, the hierarchy is divided into 9 
levels. In this research, the gas central processing plant 
is at level 4. And the maintenance object in the form of 
components is limited to level 8. Table 3 showed the 
classification of Equipment for the determination of MF. 
Whereas Table 4 showed the classification of SF. 
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TABLE 3 
EXAMPLE OF EQUIPMENT CLASS/UNIT AND MAIN FUNCTION OF GAS CENTRAL PROCESSING PLANT 
ID Asset Equipment Class/ Unit Main Function 
0101 LP Separator Separating 
0206 Glycol Regenerator Regenerating 
0301 Gas Compressor Compressing 
 
 
TABLE 4 
EXAMPLE OF SUB FUNCTION OF GAS CENTRAL PROCESSING PLANT 
ID Asset Equipment Class/ Unit Sub Function 
0101MT LP Separator Main Task 
0101CN LP Separator Controlling 
0101MN LP Separator Monitoring 
 
 
C. Determination of asset registers based on hierarchy 
Determining the assets of the register was 
determined by giving a unique tag or number so that one 
asset with the other assets did not have an identical or 
the same name. For the asset list number code, the code 
is XX-YY-ZZ-EE, where: 
1. XX = Section/System Number 
2. YY = Equipment class/unit number 
3. ZZ = Subunit/subfunction number 
4. EE = Component 
 
Table 5 showed a list of asset registers with the 
predetermined code to make it easier for workers to 
check or maintain on the field. 
Based on the asset registers, it had been shown that 
the gas central processing plant has a total component of 
674 components. From the total 674 components in 4 
components in the form of rotary, as many as 19 
components were static, 180 were piping, and 471 were 
instrument. Figure 1 showed a graph of the number of 
components present in the gas plant. 
 
D. Determine the Probability Rating 
Determination of probability rating was determined 
by describing a credible failure scenario for a 
component. After the failure scenario is described then 
the next is determining the failure mode. In this research 
determine the failure mode by using OREDA 2002. 
Determination of this failure mode will give a failure 
rate. Then from the failure rate, the MTBF value can be 
determined by dividing 1 per failure rate. Table 6 
showed the failure mode and failure rate obtained from 
OREDA 2002. Then the value of this MTBF was 
classified according to the company's Risk Matrix. 
Table 7 showed the classification of Probability Ratings 
according to the company's Risk Matrix. Table 8 
showed an example of a failure scenario and MTBF 
value of several components analyzed. 
Therefore, the failure rate per year of LP Separator 
may become: 
 
FRLpseparator =  x 8760 hours (1) 
FRLpseparator =  x 8760 hours 
FRLpseparator = 0.1869 peryear 
 
The mean between failure (MTTF) may be calculated: 
 
MTBF =     (2) 
MTBF =  
MTBF =    5.352 years 
 
 
TABLE 5 
 EXAMPLE OF ASSET REGISTER OF GAS CENTRAL PROCESSING PLANT 
Component Tag Component Name SF Equipment Class/Unit 
0101MT-V-110B LP Separator Main Task LP Separator 
0101PR-PSV-110B 
Pressure Safety 
Valve 
Pressure 
Relief 
LP Separator 
0101CN-FSD-01 Fire Shutdown Controlling LP Separator 
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Figure 1. Total asset in gas central processing plant 
 
 
TABLE 7  
REDUNDANCY DEGREE BASED ON NORSOK Z-008 2011 
Probability 
Rating 
Definition Criteria 
1 Improbable Less then Once per 15 years 
2 Unlikely Probable Once per >10-15 years 
3 Probable Once per > 5-10 years 
4 Quite Probable Once Per >1- 5 years 
5 Very Probable More than Once per year 
 
 
TABLE 8 
 REDUNDANCY DEGREE BASED ON NORSOK Z-008 
Component 
Tag 
Component 
Name 
Failure Scenario Failure Mode Selected MTBF 
Probability 
Rating 
0101MT-V-
110B 
LP 
SEPARATOR 
Unable to separating gas 
from Fluid and another 
Contaminant 
Abnormal instrument reading 
External leakage - Process 
medium 
External leakage - Utility 
medium 
5.352 3 
0101PR-PSV-
110B 
PRESSURE 
SAFETY 
VALVE 
Unable to provide 
overpressure protection 
for the LP Separator V-
110B by relieving at 600 
psig for fire case 
Fail to open on demand 
valve leakage in closed 
position 
 
6.553 
3 
0101MS-2-
VLV-PG-
103A-6-3B 
2" GLOBE 
VALVE 
MANUAL 
To control the fluid in 
PG-103A-6-3B 
Delayed Operation: 
open/closed below spec 
Fail to close on demand: 
stuck 
Fail to open on demand: 
stuck 
External leakage - process 
medium 
8.681 3 
 
 
E. Determine Consequences  
To determine the risk score must have criteria in 
conducting an assessment. For the assessment criteria 
used in this paper were HS (Health, Safety) Production 
and Environment. In most industries, the risk matrix can 
be used to classify equipment to various levels of risk. 
When defining the consequences must have clear and 
easy definition criteria to communicate with others. The 
risk matrix criteria are: 
• Risk matrix can be used for all types of 
equipment and can be used for all companies to 
assist operations. 
• Risk matrix criteria must be for all equipment 
and systems. 
The consequences for equipment are carried out by 
evaluating the potential impact of equipment failure. In 
this research, the Risk Matrix used a Risk Matrix from 
the Company. Based on Company Risk Matrix Table 9 
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showed consequence classification of Health & Safety. 
Table 10 shows the classification based on consequence 
Environment. Table 11 showed the consequence 
classification based on Production. 
 
 
TABLE 9 
CONSEQUENCES CRITERIA OF HEALTH & SAFETY BASED ON COMPANY RISK MATRIX 
Consequence 
Rating of HS 
Definition Criteria 
1 Very Low Injury Without Treatment 
2 Low Injury need Treatment with first aid Box 
3 Medium Medical Treatment Without LTA 
4 High Medical Treatment With LTA 
5 Very High Fatality 
 
 
TABLE 10 
CONSEQUENCES CRITERIA OF ENVIRONMENT BASED ON COMPANY RISK MATRIX 
Consequence 
Rating of E 
Definition Criteria 
1 Very Low Have no nuisance effect at surround area 
2 Low Notable but limited environmental impact 
3 Medium 
Environmental impact notable lasting environmental 
damage (Tier 1) 
4 High 
Large scale environmental damage with national 
significance (Tier 2) 
5 Very High 
Severe widespread irreversible environmental damage of 
international significance (Tier 3) 
 
 
TABLE 11 
CONSEQUENCES CRITERIA OF PRODUCTION BASED ON COMPANY RISK MATRIX 
Consequence 
Rating of P 
Definition Criteria 
1 Very Low Gas leak (<0,5 MMSCFD) 
2 Low Gas leak (0,5-<1 MMSCFD) 
3 Medium Gas leak (1-<5 MMSCFD) 
4 High Gas Leak (5-10 MMSCFD) 
5 Very High Gas Leak (>10 MMSCFD) 
 
 
RISK 
MATRIX 
PROBABILITY RATING 
1 2 3 4 5 
C
O
N
S
E
Q
U
E
N
C
E
 R
A
T
IN
G
 
1 1 2 3 4 5 
2 2 4 6 8 10 
3 3 6 9 12 15 
4 4 8 12 16 20 
5 5 10 15 20 25 
Figure 2. Company risk matrix 
 
 
TABLE 12 
CRITICALITY CLASSES 
Risk 
Rating 
Definition Criticality Rating Definition 
1-5 Low L Low 
5-9 Medium M Medium 
10-14 Medium High 
H High 
15-25 High 
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CRITICALITY 
MATRIX 
PROBABILITY 
1 2 3 4 5 
C
O
N
S
E
Q
U
E
N
C
E
 
1 L L L L L 
2 L L M M H 
3 L M M H H 
4 L M H H H 
5 M H H H H 
Figure 3. Criticality risk matrix 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Diagram of equipment criticality analysis of gas central processing plant 
 
 
F. Determine the Equipment Criticality Analysis 
Criticality was the combination of stated 
likelihood and the consequence of potential function 
failure. The criticality of the component will be 
determined using a risk matrix from the company. The 
risk matrix of this company will be converted into 3 
classifications, namely H (high), M (Medium), L 
(low). Figure 2 showed the Company Risk Matrix. 
Table 10 showed the conversion of the company risk 
matrix into the critical component matrix. Figure 3 
showed a picture of the component criticality matrix. 
 
G. Result 
After determining the probability rating dan 
failure consequences rating, the next step was 
determining the equipment classification or scoring the 
equipment of gas central processing plant. Based on 
the result by determining the equipment classification 
based on level critical the following result are 
obtained: 
▪ 28 equipment high risk (4%) 
▪ 192 equipment medium risk (28%) 
▪ 454 equipment low risk level (67%) 
Figure 4 showed a critical graph of the component 
based on the levels of H (High), M (Medium), L 
(Low). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this research used Equipment Criticality Analysis 
method in the causal analysis as well as determining 
the risk level of each equipment of gas central 
processing plant. Based on the application of ECA of 
gas central processing plant: 
1. Hierarchy based on the combination of ISO 14224 
and Norsok Z-008 2011 on this research divided 
into:  
• Industry: natural gas 
• Business Category: midstream 
• Installation Category: Oil/gas production 
• Plant/Unit Category: Onshore Plant 
• Section/System: 9 system 
• Equipment Class/Unit: 33 Equipment 
• Subunit/Subfunction: 140 Subunit 
• Component: 647 components 
Having a well-defined asset taxonomy may help 
the superintendent work easily. Also known the 
boundaries of plant and equipment. 
 
2. Based on criticality risk level equipment there 
were 3 levels low, medium, and high level. For 
Equipment Gas Central Processing Plant are 28 
equipment High risk level (4%). 192 equipment 
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medium risk level (28%), and 454 equipment low 
risk level (67%).   
 
3. Every critical level has different maintenance 
strategy. Low level must be corrective 
maintenance, medium level must be preventive 
maintenance if appropriate, and high level must be 
preventive maintenance because if the high-level 
risk equipment did not get preventive maintenance 
may interrupt the business for company, 
dangerous for crew, and dangerous for 
environmental. 
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